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Abstract: This paper compares the Alberta and Saskatchewan governments’ public consultation 
process for the introduction of nuclear power in their provinces. While the goal was the same – 
to gauge public reaction on a continuous policy issue – the design of their respective consultation 
process was quite different. The paper analyzes the techniques of public consultation in the 
nuclear sector, especially the use of public hearings and multiple consultative tools. Finally, it 
assesses the impact that public consultation has on government decision-making using a 
typology developed by Archon Fung.  
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Resumé: Cet article compare le processus de consultation publique des gouvernements de 
l'Alberta et la Saskatchewan pour l'introduction de l'électronucléaire dans leurs provinces. Alors 
que le but était le même – pour évaluer la réaction du publique sur une question de politique 
continue – la conception de leurs processus respectifs de consultation était très différente. Le 
document analyse les techniques de consultation publique dans le secteur nucléaire, en 
particulier l'utilisation des audiences publiques et plusieurs outils de consultation. Enfin, il 
évalue l'impact de consultation publique sur le processus décisionnel du gouvernement à l'aide 
d'une typologie développée par Archon Fung.  
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Over the last several years, there 
have been increased discussions around the 
building of new nuclear power plants in both 
Saskatchewan and Alberta. Nuclear power is 
always politically contentious, but nowhere 
more so than in geographic areas, like the 
two prairie provinces, where it has not 
existed before. Saskatchewan may be the 
heart of Canada’s uranium mining industry, 
and the Universities of Saskatchewan and 
Alberta both have slowpoke research 
reactors, but in neither province are power 
reactors present. Nuclear power advocates 
emphasis that it is a safe and economical 
source for meeting a jurisdiction’s electricity 
demand. Accidents at nuclear facilities are 
extremely rare when compared to other 
energy sources. In addition, they point out 
that nuclear energy can mitigate climate 
change because, unlike coal or natural gas 
plants, reactors do not directly emit 
greenhouse gases. They also argue that 
alternative energy, such as wind or solar 
power, cannot produce the large amounts of 
baseload electricity that is delivered by a 
modern nuclear reactor. In contrast, anti-
nuclear activists argue that public health is 
at risk due to exposure from radiation that is 
emitted from nuclear power. Radiation is 
produced from all stages of the nuclear fuel 
cycle: mining and milling; conversion, 
enrichment, and fuel fabrication; power 
generation; reprocessing; transportation; and 
waste disposal. A second argument is that 
nuclear energy is fundamentally unsafe. 
Accidents may be rare, but when they occur, 
such as at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and 
Fukushima-Daiichi, they are substantially 
worse than accidents with conventional 
energy sources. A major nuclear accident 
would lead to the immediate loss of life of 
reactor workers and emergency responders 
and, in the long-term, many thousands more 
could die due to radiation exposure.  Finally, 
they point out that nuclear energy produces 
waste that is intensely radioactive and has 
half-lives that can range from several hundred 
years to tens of thousands of years. The long-
term disposal of nuclear waste is a 
tremendous technological and managerial 
undertaking, and no country has yet to come 
up with an acceptable procedure. 
Due to this polarizing debate, public 
acceptance of nuclear power has been 
identified as a necessary political 
requirement in democratic societies. This is 
because, as Les Pal has recognized, 
policymakers must “somehow balance 
expertise with democracy. Scientists and 
experts make claims and recommendations 
based on notions of truth, not majority 
wishes. The fear is that an overly rational 
policy process will be driven more by small 
cliques of experts than by the democratic 
desires and participation of the public. The 
problem is even more acute when an issue is 
highly contentious” (2006: 261). The 
nuclear policy area is obviously one of the 
more contentious issues that governments 
have to face, so, in order to derive public 
acceptance, governments often utilize a 
thorough public consultation process. As 
Richard Florizone, the Chair of the Uranium 
Development Partnership (UDP), has 
asserted, there are four critical elements to a 
successful nuclear strategy: if it is 
technically sound and feasible, economically 
attractive, environmentally appropriate, and 
socially accepted. An effective public 
consultation process supports this strategy 
by: “inform[ing] debate and dialogue on the 
nuclear development; surface[ing] and 
explor[ing] the strong and varied 
perspectives that exist; and provid[ing] input 
into long term policy decisions” (Florizon, 
2009).  
Accordingly, both the governments 
of Saskatchewan and Alberta embarked on a 
mechanism to consult their populations on 
whether they should introduce nuclear 
power.
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 While the goal was the same – to 
gauge public reaction on a continuous policy 




issue – the design of their respective 
consultation process was quite different. 
This paper has four parts. Part one provides 
a short literature review on public 
consultation. Parts two and three are detailed 
analyses of the public consultation process 
used in Saskatchewan and Alberta. The final 
part analyzes the techniques of public 
consultation in the nuclear sector and the 
impact that it had on government decision-
making.  
Theories of Public Consultations 
 There is a growing literature 
internationally and in Canada on public 
consultations. Scholars have examined the 
public consultation process in a number of 
different sectors. For example, Julia Abelson 
and her colleagues identified 42 separate 
empirical studies of public consultation just 
in the area of health policy and bioethics 
(2013a). After the Canadian constitutional 
struggles of Meech Lake and Charlottetown, 
there was also serious discussion around 
public consultations and the constitution 
(Mendelsohn, 2000). In the nuclear sector, 
Genevieve Johnson used the concept of 
deliberative democracy to understand the 
operations of the Nuclear Waste 
Management Organization (2008). 
 Archon Fung identified a framework 
for understanding and comparing different 
forms of public consultations. Fung showed 
that there are three dimensions within which 
a public consultation process can occur: 
“who participates, how participants 
communicate with one another and make 
decisions together, and how discussions are 
linked with policy or public action” (2006: 
66). In the final section of this paper, Fung’s 
three dimensions will be applied to the 
public consultation process in Saskatchewan 
and Alberta. 
Saskatchewan’s Public Consultation 
Process 
The Saskatchewan government, in 
November 2008, appointed an expert panel 
to examine the nuclear sector. The UDP was 
to make recommendations to the 
government on value-added opportunities in 
the uranium industry: exploration and 
mining, conversion, enrichment, reactor fuel 
manufacturing, and the use of nuclear 
reactors. “The report is to include details of 
the investment, legislative and regulatory 
conditions required for nuclear development 
as well as timelines for putting enabling 
measures in place” (World Nuclear News, 
2008). The UDP was chaired by Richard 
Florizone, the Vice-President Finance at the 
University of Saskatchewan and a nuclear 
physicist. Since the mandate of the UDP was 
not to address the pros and cons of the 
uranium and nuclear industry, but to 
maximize its potential within Saskatchewan, 
it only made sense that industry leaders 
would play a significant role in the UDP’s 
composition. Thus, Duncan Hawthorne 
(President and CEO of Bruce Power), Jerry 
Grandey (President and CEO of Cameco), 
and Armand Laferrere (President and CEO 
of Areva Canada) all were on the UDP 
panel. 
The UDP report was released on 
March 31, 2009 (UDP, 2009). The thrust of 
the report was stated right in the preface: 
“we believe great potential exists for the 
Province of Saskatchewan in the uranium 
and nuclear industries. We have identified 
where we believe these opportunities lie and 
what it would take to successfully realize 
them. We have also identified efforts that 
the Partnership believes should not be 
pursued in the foreseeable future” (2009: i). 
The UDP made 40 findings and provides 20 
specific recommendations across five 
sections: exploration and mining, uranium 
upgrading, nuclear power generation, used 
fuel management, and research & 
development.
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high-priority opportunities for Saskatchewan 




appear to be exploration, mining, nuclear 
power generation, and hosting a used fuel 
repository” (2009: 90).   
 There was criticism of the UDP 
report when it was released. Of particular 
concern was the composition of the UDP, 
particularly the involvement of Grandey, 
Hawthorne, and Laferrere. Ann Coxworth, 
of the Saskatchewan Environmental Society, 
who turned down an invitation to join the 
panel because she said it would be biased, 
stated that “I think it’s got a clearly pro-
nuclear development mandate and their 
question is not whether to proceed with 
development, but how” (Kyle, 2008). Jim 
Harding, the province’s most prominent 
anti-nuclear critic, summarized many of the 
additional criticisms: a government 
commissioned panel should focus on 
renewable energy, the UDP’s assumptions 
were flawed, all aspects of the nuclear fuel 
cycle require public subsidies, and it fails to 
resolve the nuclear waste issue. A surprising 
target of opposition is the UDP 
recommendation for a centre for nuclear 
excellence. This, in Harding’s view, will 
facilitate the “collusion” between the 
nuclear industry and the academic 
community. According to Harding, “the 
nuclear industry has always counted on 
government funding for its R & D, and on 
sympathetic or oblivious scientists for doing 
it” (2009).  
The Saskatchewan government 
appointed Dan Perrins, the respected former 
head of the Saskatchewan Public Service, to 
lead a public consultation process to gather 
input on the UDP report. The consultation 
period was held between April 6, 2009, and 
July 31, 2009. It included the following 
devices: a major stakeholder conference in 
Saskatoon, hearings in Saskatoon and 
Regina, 13 community meetings across the 
province, an opportunity for individual 
stakeholder organizations to provide oral 
and/or written submissions, and a special 
opportunity for presentations from First 
Nations and Métis groups (Saskatchewan, 
2009d). A special website was also created 
that would contain “the full report, 
presentation materials, online input 
opportunities, and ultimately, the results of 
the public input.” 3  Over 2,600 people 
attended the public meetings and almost 
1,300 people responded by letter or email 
(Perrins, 2009: 19).  
A complicating feature of the public 
consultations was the issue of medical 
isotopes. The federal Department of Natural 
Resources (NRCan), in response to the 
medical isotope crisis precipitated by the 
shutting down of the NRU reactor in Chalk 
River, Ontario, sent out a call for 
expressions of interest in June 2009 for the 
future production of medical isotopes 
(NRCan, 2009b). The Government of 
Saskatchewan and the University of 
Saskatchewan submitted a comprehensive 
proposal to establish the Canadian Neutron 
Source (CNS) a new 20 MW low-enriched 
uranium multipurpose research reactor that 
would serve several purposes: production of 
medical isotopes, the delivery of neutron 
beams for neutron science, and conduct 
nuclear research (Saskatchewan, 2009c). 
Unfortunately, because NRCan established a 
deadline of July 31, 2009, it meant that the 
proposal was released at the end of the 
public consultation process making the CNS 
proposal vulnerable to criticism. David 
Orchard, a prominent political activist who 
had spoken at an earlier UDP hearing, asked 
“what’s the purpose of having public 
hearings when the Premier himself is 
declaring his plans before the hearings are 
complete” (White, 2009b). Sandra Martin, 
the New Democratic Party’s (NDP) 
environment critic, said “this is something 
that literally falls on the heels of the 
consultation process and yet there was no 
real information given to the consultation 
process through the Uranium Development 




Partnership as to proceeding with something 
like a project of this nature” (Wood, 2009). 
For his part, Premier Brad Wall argued that 
the proposal had to be released before the 
completion of the UDP public consultation 
process because of the deadline established 
by NRCan and promised to withdraw the 
CNS proposal “if it doesn’t reflect the will 
of Saskatchewan people” (White, 2009b).  
Despite the timing of the release of 
the CNS proposal, there actually was some 
preliminary discussion about medical 
isotopes and nuclear research. This is 
because one of the UDP’s recommendations 
was to “partner with the Federal 
Government to pursue the construction of a 
research reactor in the Province as a 
complement to synergies with existing 
research infrastructure and capabilities and 
to better position the Province to participate 
in multiple areas of study. Pursue medical 
isotope production as part of the reactor’s 
mandate” (UDP, 2009: 87). During the UDP 
consultation process, most people supported 
the production of medical isotopes, but 
“nearly three-quarters supported medical 
isotopes created without fission” (Perrins, 
2009: 104). However, this opinion ignores 
the scientific reality that it is not technically 
feasible in the near-term, and possibly 
medium and long-term, to create medical 
isotopes without using nuclear fission. Mo-
99 and Technetium-99m (TC-99m) are the 
most widely used isotopes with applications 
in cardiology, skeleton, brain, thyroid, lungs, 
liver, spleen, kidney, gall bladder, bone 
marrow, salivary glands, etc. In both cases, 
they can only be produced with a nuclear 
reactor. A cyclotron and high-energy photon 
can, in theory, create isotopes, but the yield 
is very small, cannot be sustained for a 
period of time, requires more R & D, and is 
much more expensive than nuclear 
fission.
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A cyclotron has an additional 
problem because it produces TC-99m 
directly (it cannot produce Mo-99), 
combined with TC-99m’s very short six 
hour half-life, it means that “cyclotron 
technology cannot serve the needs of more 
remote hospitals in Canada because the 
significant transportation distance/time 
would be impractical given the amount of 
decay that would occur” (NRCan, 2009a: 
32). If it was easy to produce medical 
isotopes why is over 90% of the world’s 
production done by five reactors that are all 
over forty years old?
5
  
 On September 15, 2009, the 
Saskatchewan government released The 
Future of Uranium, Dan Perrins’ UDP 
public consultation report (Perrins, 2009). 
Perrins was given a very strict mandate. He 
was restricted to simply summarize “public 
input and feedback from stakeholders and 
citizens gathered through the public 
consultations process.” He was not to act as 
“a spokesperson for the UDP or the 
government of Saskatchewan” nor was he to 
“advocate for or against the key findings and 
recommendations contained in the UDP 
report.” Finally, Perrins would “not make 
recommendations for further action with 
regard to uranium industry development 
except to recommend further public 
consultations and/or the provision of further 
information to the public” (Saskatchewan, 
2009d).  
 The Future of Uranium revealed 
significant opposition to nuclear energy in 
Saskatchewan. The document identified 
eight main themes that emerged out of the 
responses to the public consultation process:  
 85% were opposed to nuclear power 
generation; 
 Concerns about health, safety, and 
environment; 
 86% were opposed to nuclear waste 
storage; 
 Concerns about the costs of uranium 
development; 
 98% support for renewable energy 
sources; 




 Concerns about the UDP report 
(composition, mandate, quality of 
information, information on alternative 
energy sources); 
 Different degrees of opposition to 
uranium mining and exploration
6
; and 
 A need for more and better information 
about nuclear power and all energy 
sources.  
 
Beyond these eight major themes, Perrins 
identified another eight themes. There were 
three themes related to uranium: 70% were 
opposed to uranium upgrading (conversion, 
enrichment, fuel fabrication); 42% were 
opposed to uranium research, training, and 
development, but a majority favoured the 
production of medical isotopes
7
; and 88% 
were opposed to the UDP strategy for 
Saskatchewan. Perrins also noted that 98% 
of responders viewed the public consultation 
process as inadequate. 88% believed that it 
would have no impact on the government. 
Finally, there were four themes on 
establishing Saskatchewan’s future energy 
policy: public concerns about the 
involvement and public participation of First 
Nations and Métis Peoples and the duty to 
consult; 95% of responders felt that the 
government should focus on reducing 
energy consumption; a discussion on 
whether Saskatchewan should have an 
independent energy production system or 
whether it should work with other 
jurisdictions in North America; and a 
discussion over who should deliver energy 
for the province (SaskPower or some other 
combination).   
 From these themes, Perrins made 
nine recommendations regarding future 
public consultations and further information 
on energy. First, the Government of 
Saskatchewan should “develop a 
consolidated report on all power generation 
options and make this report available to the 
public.” This report should “document the 
health, safety, environmental, and economic 
considerations” for each energy option. 
Second, SaskPower should “publicly release 
any existing analyses it has already 
undertaken regarding provincial power 
needs, the current state of its infrastructure, 
and future options for response.” Third, the 
Government of Saskatchewan should 
“commission a study to review the current 
research on the health impacts on nuclear 
power and that this study, and a publicly 
consumable summary version, be publicly 
released.” Fourth, the Government of 
Saskatchewan should “initiate a public 
information campaign regarding the 
production and use of medical isotopes and 
make this report available to the public.” A 
particular focus of this medical isotope 
report is the proposed CNS: “What will it 
produce, what technology will it use, what 
will it cost, and how is it similar or different 
from proposals submitted by other 
jurisdictions?” Recommendations five, six, 
and seven called for separate consultation 
processes for First Nations and Métis 
peoples plus the Athabasca Basin (home of 
the uranium mining activity) centred on the 
Crown’s Duty to Consult. The final two 
recommendations address the frequent 
demand for more information. Eighth, 
forums should be “organized on an ongoing 
basis to facilitate dialogue, debate, and 
publication and information dissemination 
through the media.” In particular, both the 
Universities of Saskatchewan and Regina 
should host large-scale conferences to 
discuss “nuclear generation, environmental 
health and community health” and “explore 
other options for future power generation.” 
Ninth, the Government of Saskatchewan 
should “use mechanisms such as surveys, 
focus groups and polling on an ongoing 
basis to assess the knowledge, 
understanding, information needs and views 
of the public” (Perrins, 2009, 137-142).  




  The Future of Uranium, by 
summarizing the responses to the public 
consultation process and limiting the 
recommendations to “further public 
consultation and/or the provision of further 
information to the public,” stuck to the 
mandate that Dan Perrins was given 
(Perrins, 2009: 137). However, in several 
key respects, the design of the public 
consultations was flawed and these flaws 
will likely not lead to clarifying the public’s 
views about the nuclear sector, but may end 
up significantly muddying the debate. For 
example, the media reported that 85% of 
Saskatchewanians opposed nuclear power 
generation, but it was actually 85% of 
responders who attended public meetings or 
submitted letters to the UDP public 
consultation process who opposed nuclear 
power generation. There is a big difference. 
This was not the fault of the report, but 
rather a major misinterpretation by the 
media of the report’s findings. As Perrins 
noted in his report, “the responses 
summarized are not necessarily 
representative of the Saskatchewan 
population and cannot be linked back to the 
population with any statistical reliability” 
(emphasis added, 2009: 36). Nevertheless, 
Perrins should have taken precautionary 
steps to ensure that the media did not make 
such a fundamental error on a politically 
charged subject.  
First, there was a problem with The 
Future of Uranium’s methodology. In many 
ways, the methodology of the study, which 
coded qualitative responses to generate 
quantitative statistics, was consistent with 
established social science practices. 
Unfortunately Perrins decided to count all 
responses equally. This was problematic in 
two respects. There was an unknown 
number of multiple responses from the same 
individual due to “speaking a number of 
times at a public meeting, submitting a 
series of written pieces, or through a 
combination of those scenarios” (Perrins, 
2009: 35). More worrisome was the fact that 
responses from large organizations (i.e., the 
Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce, Cameco, 
etc.) counted the same as responses from 
small organizations (i.e., Fellowship for 
Reconciliation and Peace, Singers of the 
Sacred Web, etc.) or even an individual.   
A second flaw, and again consistent 
with the mandate he was given, was that 
Perrins made no attempt to evaluate the 
quality or factual accuracy of the responses. 
Several simple examples should suffice. 
60% of responders stated that they wanted 
medical isotopes, but without nuclear fission 
(Perrins, 2009: 103). This is like saying that 
I want to drive a car, but do not want to use 
gasoline. Electric cars may be possible, but 
with current technology, are expensive and 
inefficient with a very small market share. 
Similarly, it is possible to produce some 
medical isotopes without the fission process, 
but with current technology it is very 
expensive and inefficient. 70% of 
responders criticized the composition of the 
UDP because it was loaded with senior 
industry representatives even though it was 
designed to be a government-industry 
partnership (Perrins, 2009: 75-76). 65% of 
responders criticized the UDP for not 
writing more about alternative energy 
sources even though its mandate was to 
focus on the economic potential of uranium 
development (Perrins, 2009: 80-81). When 
these sorts of responses are taken at face 
value, is it any wonder that The Future of 
Uranium avoided a comprehensive 
evaluation of the arguments (both pro and 
con) surrounding the health, safety, 
environmental, security and economic issues 
of the nuclear sector.  
The Wall government initially 
accepted Perrins’ report with caution. 
Energy and Resources Minister Bill Boyd 
suggested that “when I look at this report, 
it’s neither a green light nor a red light for 




the future uranium development. It’s more 
like a yellow light – take any next steps with 
caution…my foot is off the accelerator” 
(Hall, 2009b). However, nuclear critics used 
The Future of Uranium to say “the people 
have spoken.” For example, the 
Saskatchewan Environmental Society 
argued that the report shows that the 
government should stop pursuing nuclear 
power and turn its attention to renewable 
energy sources, greater energy efficiency, 
and conservation (Hall, 2009b). Sandra 
Martin, the NDP’s environment critic, stated 
that the Perrins report is “a good barometer 
of the passion that’s out there….Given this 
report, it’s clear that the government is 
moving contrary to what people are saying” 
(White, 2009b). According to Murray 
Mandryk, a columnist with the Regina 
Leader-Post, the report “screamed at the 
government to slam on [the] brakes” of 
nuclear development in the province 
(2009b).  
On December 17, 2009, the 
Saskatchewan government outlined its 
strategic direction for uranium development 
in the province: 
 Continue to facilitate the uranium 
exploration and mining that has taken 
place in Saskatchewan for over 50 years. 
 Encourage investment in nuclear 
research, development and training 
opportunities, specifically in the areas of 
mining, neutron science, isotopes, small 
scale reactor design and enrichment. 
 Reserve decisions on supporting 
Saskatchewan communities interested in 
hosting nuclear waste management 
facilities to when such proposals are 
advanced in a regulatory process; and 
 Direct SaskPower to continue including 
nuclear power in the range of energy 
options available for additional baseload 
generation capacity in the medium and 
long term after 2020 (Saskatchewan, 
2009a). 
 
At the same time, the Saskatchewan 
government released its official response to 
the UDP report and the public consultation 
process. Energy and Resources Minister Bill 
Boyd said that “[t]hrough the UDP’s 
extensive research and Dan Perrins’ follow-
up consultations, we have received the most 
comprehensive overview of the uranium 
industry in our province’s history. We 
reaffirm our belief in, and our need for, a 
strong future for the industry that goes 
beyond exploration and extraction” 
(Saskatchewan, 2009b). The Saskatchewan 
government endorsed all but two of the 
UDP’s recommendation: a nuclear power 
plant by 2020, and the “maintenance of the 
current physical claim staking system, given 
the investment already made in developing 
an electronic claim staking system” 
(Saskatchewan, 2009a).  
 There were three notable features of 
the Saskatchewan government’s 
announcement. First, was the decision to not 
pursue a nuclear power plant at the present 
time. This was probably the most important 
recommendation of the UDP report and a 
project that Bruce Power had proposed in 
November, 2008 (Bruce Power, 2008). It 
was also something that the Wall 
government had previously given 
indications that it was going to support. 
Nevertheless, Boyd stated that the 
government had “carefully evaluated” Bruce 
Power’s “initial plans,” but “uncertainty 
around long-term costs to consumers 
remain[ed] a lingering concern. Further, the 
large scale of the proposed nuclear power 
investment that may arise requires a regional 
approach involving, ideally, all three prairie-
provinces for successful implementation” 
(Saskatchewan, 2009b). Boyd did not rule 
out a future nuclear plant proposal, 
suggesting that “when you look at beyond 
2020, we still think it should be in the basket 
of options that SaskPower has to take a look 




at” (Hall, 2009a). Advocates of nuclear 
power also took comfort in the date of 2020, 
because it takes about a decade for a reactor 




Second, the Saskatchewan 
government reversed its earlier stance
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, and 
endorsed the UDP’s recommendation to 
support any Saskatchewan community that 
might consider hosting a long-term nuclear 
waste repository. However,  “[i]t still 
reserves decisions and its options around a 
geological repository for nuclear waste and 
communities that might want to host such a 
facility, while acknowledging the Nuclear 
Waste Management Organization’s 
consultation and siting process in this 
regard” (Saskatchewan, 2009a). 
Third, the Saskatchewan government 
ignored the results of the UDP public 
consultation process that it had put together. 
For instance, the Perrins report showed that 
88% of participants were opposed to the 
overall UDP strategy. Yet, the government’s 
uranium strategy was “massively pro-
uranium industry and pro-development” 
(Mandryk, 2009a). Regarding nuclear power 
generation, the Perrins’ report showed that 
85% of responders were opposed to nuclear 
power generation and there were particularly 
strong concerns about health, safety, and 
environment. However, the government 
simply delayed its decision on nuclear 
power generation – it did not close the door 
– due solely to cost considerations. The 
government also took pains to emphasize 
Perrins’ caveat that he issued prior to 
quantifying what he had heard through the 
public consultation process: “the responses 
summarized here are not necessarily 
representative of the Saskatchewan 
population and cannot be linked back to the 
population with any statistical reliability” 
(emphasis added). Instead, the government 
recognized that “recent independent polling 
has shown support for the nuclear industry” 
(Saskatchewan, 2009a). Although the 
government generally agreed with Perrins’ 
number one recommendation – more 
consultation over nuclear power was needed 
– it emphasized that “significant 
consultation has already occurred and is 
occurring, not only through the recent public 
consultation process, but also in connection 
with earlier uranium mining decisions, 
through regular public polling and surveying 
and through the work of the Standing 
Committee on Crown and Central Agencies” 
(Saskatchewan, 2009a). 
The reaction to the Saskatchewan 
government’s announcement was mixed. 
Bruce Power viewed “this announcement as 
not being very far off our take on what 
potential there is in Saskatchewan. 
Saskatchewan obviously continues to 
consider nuclear energy as part of its mix. 
Nothing has been ruled out. We don’t see it 
really changing that much as we’ve always 
looked at 2020 and beyond” (Hall, 2009a). 
Ironically, some environmentalists also 
appeared pleased with the same decision. 
Ann Coxworth said that “nuclear power has 
been the elephant in the room in all of our 
thinking about energy planning for the next 
decade and while the elephant hasn’t been 
killed, it’s securely locked up in its cage” 
(Hall, 2009a). However, other 
environmentalists wanted “the door 
completely shut on it” (Hall, 2009a). Some 
nuclear supporters were also upset with the 
government. The Saskatchewan Chamber of 
Commerce was disappointed that the 
government based its decision on cost, “but 
when you start to take into account the 
carbon costs, you take into account 
escalating infrastructure costs for any type 
of new power supply, they should have done 
full due diligence. They’ve written it off for 
reasons that are unknown to us” (Hall, 
2009a). 
The December 2009 decision was 
followed up by a number of pro-nuclear 




announcements by the Wall government. 
For example, in August 2010, Energy 
Minister Boyd told a group of uranium 
conference delegates in Saskatoon that small 
reactors, producing less than 500 MWs of 
electricity, makes a lot of sense for 
Saskatchewan (Kyle, 2010). In November 
2010, the Wall government announced that 
it supported federal legislation that would 
open up foreign investment in the uranium 
sector (Bouw and McCarthy, 2010). Finally, 
in January, 2011, Premier Wall announced a 
three-pronged nuclear agenda: nuclear 
medicine, nuclear research and 
development, and small reactors for 
electricity (Wood, 2011). Wall maintained 
that while the province has no immediate 
plans to build a small reactor for electricity 
generation, it continues to investigate the 
idea. Saskatchewan could be “replacing coal 
plants down the road, smaller coal plants 
with smaller nuclear facilities.” Wall further 
stated that “this isn’t the end of the nuclear 
centre story, either. You’ll see us moving 
with private partners on the small reactor 
side” (Warren, 2011).  
The March 2011 accident at the 
Japanese Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power 
plant led many governments around the 
world to reconsider their use of nuclear 
energy. In the case of Saskatchewan, the 
government has affirmed that it will 
continue to pursue uranium mining, nuclear 
medicine, material science and research on 
small reactor technology. Innovation 
Minister Rob Norris, who is also responsible 
for SaskPower, said that “we need to make 
sure that we’re contributing to this dialogue, 
to the discussion and actually to the science 
about making the technology safer.” He also 
argued that Saskatchewan, as one of the 
world’s largest uranium producers, has “an 
ethical obligation” to move forward with its 
uranium mining. The government also 
reiterated its pledge to develop a public-
private partnership to determine whether a 
small reactor would fit into the province’s 
existing electricity grid (Graham, 2011). 
SaskPower has continued to investigate the 
possible use of small modular reactors 
(SMRs) post-2020 in the province. This has 
included signing a memorandum of 
understanding with GE-Hitachi Nuclear 
Energy, attending SMR workshops hosted 
by the Canadian Nuclear Association, and 
other initiatives. As Robert Watson, 
SaskPower CEO, has admitted, “We're just 
keeping our eye on it, making sure we 
understand the technology to make informed 
recommendations when we need to, but not 
for a while, quite frankly” (McMurtry, 
2014). 
Post-Fukushima, Saskatchewan 
remains committed to its nuclear strategy in 
other ways. For example, it established the 
Sylvia Fedoruk Canadian Centre for Nuclear 
Innovation in March 2011 with $30 million 
in funding over seven years (Saskatchewan, 
2011). The Fedoruk Centre, which was one 
of the key recommendations of the UDP, 
would focus on four areas: nuclear 
medicine, materials science, nuclear energy, 
and physical and social environment. The 
purpose of the Fedoruk Centre was “to place 
Saskatchewan among global leaders in 
nuclear research, development and training 
through investment in partnerships with 
academia and industry, for maximum 
societal and economic benefit” (Sylvia 
Fedoruk Centre, 2014). It would do this 
through funding research projects, 
developing academic programs, and 
managing specialized facilities such as a 
new cyclotron to produce medical isotopes 
which will be operational in early 2015.  
Alberta’s Public Consultation Process 
The Alberta government was behind 
the rest of the provincial nuclear policy 
sector in considering the ramifications of 
nuclear power within the province. Energy 
Alberta Corp., and later Bruce Power, were 
involved in building public support for a 




nuclear power plant, making arrangements 
for reactor vendors, and selecting a site. 
Grassroots nuclear organizations, like the 
Peace River Environmental Society (PRES) 
and Citizens Advocating the Use of 
Sustainable Energy (CAUSE), were starting 
to mobilize. The media was covering the 
emerging story. What was lacking was 
government involvement. There were some 
initial musings from politicians, and some 
preliminary discussions within the 
departments of energy and environment, but 
that was about it.  
Eventually the Alberta government 
decided that it had to get more involved in 
the growing nuclear debate. In April 2008, 
the Alberta government appointed the 
Nuclear Power Expert Panel (NPEP), 
chaired by former federal Conservative 
Cabinet Minister Harvey Andre, to prepare a 
comprehensive report on nuclear power in 
Alberta. The NPEP would examine:  
environmental, health and safety issues; 
waste management; comparing nuclear 
energy with other electricity generation 
technologies; current and future nuclear 
power generation being used in Canada and 
around the world; Alberta’s future electricity 
needs; and social issues/concerns related to 
nuclear energy (Alberta, 2008a). The report 
would not make any recommendations; 
instead the panel’s mandate was to “prepare 
a balanced and objective Report for the 
government of Alberta on factual issues 
pertinent to the use of nuclear power to 
supply electricity in Alberta” (Alberta, 
2008b). The panel’s findings would be used 
as the basis for a public consultation process 
that would gather input from Albertans.  
The NPEP was released by the 
Alberta government on March 26, 2009 
(Alberta, 2009d). Although it does not 
contain any recommendations, it did make 
some important conclusions that would 
frame the debate over the development of 
nuclear power in Alberta. These are the key 
conclusions of the NPEP: Alberta will need 
additional electricity; all technologies have 
trade-offs; building a power plant is a 
private sector decision, but regulated by 
government; nuclear power has existed 
around the world for over 50 years; nuclear 
power, unlike other mainstream electricity 
sources, does not release carbon dioxide; 
and nuclear waste is a major concern.  
A thorough examination of the tone 
and emphasis within the NPEP report 
revealed strong support for the development 
of nuclear power in Alberta. The report 
made clear that the demand for electricity 
will rise in Alberta estimating annual 
increases of 3.3% until 2024 (Alberta, 
2009d: 14). Therefore the question is what 
electricity sources will be used to meet the 
demand: coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, 
wind, solar, or nuclear? On this point about 
comparative energy sources, the NPEP 
repeatedly emphasized that the absence of 
greenhouse gases in the generation of 
nuclear power “is a significant difference (in 
environmental terms) between it and 
technologies using traditional coal and 
natural gas” (Alberta, 2009d: 52). When the 
discussion turned to renewable energy, the 
NPEP pointed out that “while there is 
considerable interest in other non-
conventional power generation means such 
as geothermal, bio-fuel, solar, etc., it is 
unlikely that these technologies will be able 
to satisfy all of Alberta’s growing electricity 
needs” (Alberta, 2009d: 10). In addition, 
“compared with hydroelectric and wind 
power, nuclear has a smaller physical 
footprint on the landscape” (Alberta, 2009d: 
52).  
Nuclear waste is a prominent issue 
among both anti-nuclear activists and the 
public in general. How can highly toxic 
elements, some of which have half-lifes in 
the range of hundreds of thousands of years, 
be effectively handled? The NPEP’s 
response was twofold. It began by 




emphasizing the role that fuel recycling 
(also called reprocessing) can play in 
significantly reducing the amount of waste. 
It highlighted the fact that “more than 99%” 
of spent fuel “is made up of the heavy 
metals uranium and plutonium, which can 
be recycled into nuclear fuel. The remaining 
waste fission products decay comparatively 
quickly” (Alberta, 2009d: 53). All of this is 
true, and in fact, is critical to mitigating 
substantially the long-term nuclear waste 
issue. The problem is that fuel recycling is 
not yet cost effective. However, there is a 
ramped up research and development effort 
in this area that should start to bring results. 
Its second point was to describe in detail 
Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management 
Organization’s Phased Adaptive 
Management approach to spent fuel 
(Alberta, 2009d: 34).  
The NPEP acknowledged that 
“opinions on nuclear safety tend to be highly 
polarized between supporters and 
opponents, making it more difficult to 
develop an objective, balanced view of the 
risks and impacts” (Alberta, 2009d: 35). 
Nevertheless, the report followed that 
statement up with a detailed chapter 
identifying all of the comprehensive safety 
features of a nuclear reactor (Alberta, 
2009d: 35-43). In the process, it minimized 
the risks of radiation exposure (by 
comparing nuclear-created radiation and 
natural radiation), reactor safety (by listing 
the triple redundancies of control, cool, and 
contain features), the lessons learned from 
accidents such as Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl, and the role played by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and 
the World Association of Nuclear Operators 
in ensuring reactor safety). The NPEP was 
correct to note that nuclear reactors have 
been functioning for six decades with few 
fatalities. Chernobyl being the obvious 
exception, and even then, it notes that the 
“consequences” have often been 
“overstated” (Alberta, 2009d: 42). When 
these facts are presented, it becomes 
apparent that around the world, nuclear 
power has a substantially better safety 
record than any other energy source, and 
better than other sectors such as construction 
or agriculture.   
Critics who were hoping for a 
denouncement of nuclear power have argued 
that the NPEP was biased. For example, 
Gordon Edwards, President of the Canadian 
Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, bluntly 
said that “they are really presenting a very 
one-sided, very limited picture which 
doesn’t give the average member of the 
public, or the average politicians, any real 
insight into the nature of the hazards that are 
peculiar to nuclear” (Brooymans, 2009). 
Meanwhile, Brian Mason, the leader of the 
Alberta New Democratic Party complained 
that the panel “cannot claim to be unbiased 
when it clearly tries to abdicate 
responsibility of the decision to have or not 
have nuclear power. B.C. and Manitoba 
have anti-nuke policies and we should too” 
(Diotte, 2009). CAUSE argued that the 
NPEP was riddled with errors and 
omissions: failing to discuss the design and 
construction problems of generation III+ 
reactors; avoiding the risks and 
consequences of a nuclear accident; ignoring 
the Nuclear Liability Act that makes 
insurance available to nuclear operators at a 
fraction of the costs of a catastrophic 
accident; failing to address the health risks 
of nuclear power; and ignoring the real 
financial costs of nuclear power (CAUSE, 
2009a; CAUSE, 2009b; Bell and Weis, 
2009). 
Nuclear power is very politically 
contentious. Therefore, it is crucial that the 
people are heard. The NPEP served as the 
basis for a “multi-faceted consultation 
process” that was designed to gather the 
views of Albertans on nuclear power. 




Innovative Research Group, an independent 
research firm, was commissioned by the 
government to collect the data and provide a 
summary to the government (Alberta, 
2009b; Alberta, 2009c). The process, which 
took place between April 27 and June 1, 
included a telephone survey (1, 024 people), 
twenty randomly selected discussion groups 
(193 individuals), stakeholder discussion 
groups (First Nations and Métis, 
community, business, environmental, and all 
of the province’s anti-nuclear groups), and 
an online and mail-in questionnaire (3, 615 
responses) (Innovative, 2009). 
Not all stakeholders participated in 
the public consultation process. For 
example, Bruce Power, despite being the 
principal advocate for nuclear power in 
Alberta, deliberately avoided the public 
consultation process. In contrast, the anti-
nuclear organizations, despite being very 
critical of the process, participated in the 
stakeholder sessions in Edmonton. CAUSE 
was upset that the online workbook started 
with the executive summary of the NPEP. 
This led them to allege that “a biased 
nuclear panel report with one-sided, pro-
nuclear information will play a key role” in 
the public discussions. They believed that a 
counter-document, focusing on alternative 
energy, needed to be commissioned by the 
government to balance the debate. Instead of 
“selective meetings with stakeholders and 
some focus groups,” they recommended that 
“public hearings be held throughout the 
province” (CAUSE, 2009a).  
On December 14, 2009, the Alberta 
government announced its conditional 
support for nuclear power in the province. 
“Alberta,” as Energy Minister Mel Knight 
explained, “will maintain its existing policy 
where power generation options are 
proposed by the private sector in the 
province and considered on a case-by-case 
basis. We will work with the federal 
government regarding any nuclear power 
application to ensure provincial rules and 
environmental standards are respected. 
Further, we will not invest public dollars in 
any nuclear power proposals” (Alberta, 
2009a).  
The Alberta government based its 
decision, in part, on the public consultation 
process that was conducted on the entry of 
nuclear power into the province. According 
to Knight, “Albertans have told us that we 
shouldn’t be closed to new generation 
technologies that could provide clean, low-
emission power. At the same time Albertans 
have identified concerns with nuclear power 
that potential future applicants will need to 
fully address” (Alberta, 2009a). The public 
consultation report, compiled by Innovative 
Research Group Inc., was released at the 
same time as the government’s 
announcement (Innovative, 2009). As Table 
1 shows, the different consultation tools led 
to different results. Most noticeably it shows 
that randomly-selected Albertans (telephone 
survey and discussion groups) were more 
supportive of nuclear power than self-
selected Albertans (submission of 
workbook). A probable explanation for the 
division between randomly-selected and 
self-selected Albertans is the efforts by the 
anti-nuclear groups to mobilize people to fill 
out the survey, but in a way that opposed 
nuclear power. For example, CAUSE sent 
out emails, labelled a “call for action,” 
through affiliated organizations with 
instructions on how to fill out the survey. 
They wrote that “the information preceding 
the survey is full of false and missing 
information. I am attaching again CAUSE’s 
response to the Nuclear Panel Report, our 
alternative report and media release. Here is 
a summary of some of the errors in the 
government document preceding the survey 
(this new government document is similar, 
but not identical, to the Nuclear Panel 
Report.)”10  A second feature of the public 
consultation report was that the discussion 




groups showed that, when more information 
was provided, the level of opposition to 
nuclear power dropped. This was consistent 
with the telephone survey and workbook 
submission which showed a strong 
correlation between how informed people 
were about nuclear power and electricity and 





Table 1: Comparing Alberta’s Nuclear Power Public Consultation Results by Instrument 









19% 22% 28% 
Considered on a case-
by-case basis 
45% 57% 16% 
Province should 
oppose proposals 
27% 13% 55% 
Don’t Know 8% 8% 1% 
Source: Innovative Research Group Inc., Alberta Nuclear Consultation. Report prepared for: The Alberta 
Government – Department of Energy (2009). Accessed on 14 December 2009 at 
http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Electricity/pdfs/AlbertaNuclearConsultationFull.pdf 
 
The reaction to the Alberta 
government’s announcement was 
predictable. Bruce Power saw the decision 
as a green light. Duncan Hawthorne, Bruce 
Power’s CEO, stated that [i]t’s encouraging 
to see the door remain open for us to 
demonstrate we can bring value to the 
province and help Alberta meet its future 
energy needs without contributing to 
greenhouse gas emissions” (Fekete, 2009). 
Local anti-nuclear groups, despite predicting 
in advance the government’s decision, were 
nevertheless outraged. Adele Boucher 
Rymhs, president of the Coalition for a 
Nuclear Free Alberta, argued that “[t]he 
government didn’t listen” (Fekete, 2009). 
Similarly, Elena Schacherl, the founder of 
CAUSE, complained that the government 
“ignored the 55 per cent opposition to 
nuclear from the 3, 600 Albertans who filled 
out the consultation workbook.” For 
Schacherl, the“[t]he consultation results 
were the culmination of a process that right 
from the start suggested that the government 
had already made up its mind about nuclear. 
They set out to convince rather than consult 
Albertans” (2009). In contrast, the large 
environmental groups (Sierra Club and 
Pembina Institute) argued that “[n]ot 
providing public dollars to subsidize the 
nuclear industry hits the final nail in the 
nuclear energy coffin for the province” 
(Fekete, 2009).  
Alberta’s decision to allow nuclear 
power on a case-by-case basis gives 
approval to Bruce Power to move forward 
on its project. If the province had said no, 
then Bruce Power would have obviously 
abandoned the project. However, the 
conditional “yes” from the government only 
met one of Bruce Power’s conditions. The 
other conditions include a willing host 
community, a successful environmental 
assessment, and a profitable business case. 
While it was waiting for a government 
decision, Bruce Power has been doing some 
preliminary work. It has secured the land for 
the Whitemud site. It is also conducting a 
public education and consultation campaign 
with the local community. Finally, it has 
started some of the pre-environmental 
assessment work (water flow and 
temperature, soil studies, etc.)
12
. 
Despite the government approval, 
Bruce Power eventually decided to 
withdraw from its reactor proposal in Peace 
River (Thomas and Stolte, 2011). Although 




no public explanation was provided, Bruce 
Power’s decision-making calculus was 
probably based on low natural gas prices. 
High natural gas prices were a driver for the 
interest in nuclear energy in Alberta in 
2007-2009. However, the recent drop in 
natural gas prices, largely due to the 
discovery of shale gas in large parts of the 
United States, has greatly diminished that 
interest. Natural gas prices had been 
relatively high since 2003 and had peaked in 
price at $9.84/gj in July 2008. At which 
point they had started a steady decline and 
by October 2011, the price was $3.17/gj. In 
fact, natural gas had not been above $6/gj 
since December 2008 (Alberta, 2011). Gas-
fired plants, due to their peaking ability, 
relatively lower rate of GHG emissions (at 
least in comparison to coal), and superior 
construction timelines, are the major 
competitor to nuclear. Therefore, low 
natural gas prices are an economic incentive 
to build gas-fired plants as opposed to 
nuclear power plants.  
Analysis 
Both Saskatchewan and Alberta used 
different tools in their respective public 
consultation process over nuclear power. 
This allows a policy analyst to make some 
observations about the strengths and 
weaknesses of different designs. It also 
allows for an examination of the impact that 
public consultation has on government 
decision-making. Designing the appropriate 
mechanisms is critical.  
Applying Fung’s three dimensions, 
which were outlined in the second section of 
this paper, to the public consultations in 
Saskatchewan and Alberta reveals several 
differences in the processes, but also some 
similarities. First, is the dimension of 
participation: who participated in the 
process and who did not? The biggest 
difference between the two processes was 
public hearings, which were done in 
Saskatchewan but not in Alberta. A major 
benefit of public hearings is to provide 
greater political legitimacy for the eventual 
decision. This is expressed in the concept of 
deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy “take the ideal of the informed 
and uncoerced dialogue of all those who 
could be bound or affected by policy (or 
their accountable representatives) as an 
appropriately high standard of justice and 
legitimacy.” It is critical that the dialogue – 
such as public hearings – allows “all those 
potentially affected by the outcomes freely 
draw from their experiences and expertise, 
mutually exchange their perspectives, and 
ultimately exercise their decisional agency” 
(Johnson, 2008: 45). As was shown earlier, 
critics of Alberta’s decision not to hold 
public hearings emphasized that the 
omission constituted a democratic 
deficiency.     
An additional benefit of public 
hearings is that, while not a statistically 
representative sample of public opinion, it 
did, in the case of Saskatchewan, reveal a 
cross-section of groups that are strongly 
opposed to most (for some, all) aspects of 
the nuclear sector. The range of opposition 
groups (environmental, labour unions, 
peace, religious, etc.), the geographic range 
of the opposition (all parts of the province, 
no NIMBY syndrome here), and the range 
of arguments (economic, health, 
environmental, peace, etc.) against nuclear 
expansion was wide indeed. Everybody in 
Saskatchewan, organizations and individuals 
alike, could have participated in the UDP 
public consultation process. The fact that it 
was the anti-nuclear forces who mobilized is 
something that the government cannot 
ignore. A highly motivated minority can 
often overwhelm a soft majority by its 
intensity.  
There is a danger that public 
hearings can often be hijacked by special 
interest groups. Commenting on previous 




public hearings, Colin Hunt, of the Canadian 
Nuclear Association, noted that: 
It didn’t matter where you were in Canada, it was 
exactly the same faces testifying at the previous 
one...the usual horde of anti-nuclear groups. That’s 
who participated in these hearings...The public 
didn’t speak. All the Panel heard from was a 
handful of special interest groups repeating their 
message time after time after time. So, my 
question becomes then, is it legitimate to translate 
a handful of public interest groups to say, or so-
called interest groups, to say they constitute the 
public interest (Johnson, 2008: 79). 
 
This scenario played out again in 
Saskatchewan as anti-nuclear activists 
packed the public hearings and submitted 
the majority of submissions (Warren, 
2009b). The UDP public consultation 
process, as a Bruce Power official admitted, 
allowed the: 
anti-nuclear movement to mobilize and unify. It 
gave all of the opposition groups an opportunity 
and platform. They could say what they wanted 
without any consequences. Opinions, even 
misguided ones, even completely wrong ones, 
were equally counted as facts. The Perrins report, 




Fung has argued that participants in 
public hearings “are frequently quite 
unrepresentative of any larger public” 
(2006: 67). This is reflected in public 
hearings about nuclear issues, with the 
exception of hearings at potential reactor 
sites (which will be included in the 
consultation process), where participants are 
rabid anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear activists. 
It is to avoid this problem that focus groups, 
where the participants are not told what the 
topic is in advance, were used to provide 
input from Albertans who were undecided 
about nuclear power. Allowing any 
interested person to fill out the workbook (in 
combination with the stakeholder 
consultations and focus groups) was a 
legitimate compromise. Fung has suggested 
that “selectively recruiting” individuals can 
be a useful tactic to ensure that key or 
disadvantaged groups are heard from (2006: 
67). So stakeholders from the Peace Region 
were invited to a special consultation 
meeting. But it was a closed meeting, 
meaning that it was by invitation only, and 
no media was allowed. It is interesting that 
many of the most vocal and organized critics 
of nuclear power in Alberta participated in 
these stakeholder sessions. 
Fung’s second dimension was how 
the participants communicated with each 
other and made decisions together. This is 
conceived as a spectrum of communication 
modes (listen as speaker, express 
preferences, and develop preferences) and 
decision-making modes (aggregate and 
bargain, deliberate and negotiate, and deploy 
technique and expertise) (Fung, 2006: 68-
69). In both Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
despite using different mechanisms in their 
respective public consultations, participants 
were restricted to communication, albeit the 
most intense form of communication 
(developing preferences), and were not 
involved in decision-making.   
Fung’s third dimension was the 
impact of public discussions on policy 
action. Fung identifies five categories of 
influence and authority (personal benefits, 
communicate influence, advise and consult, 
co-governance, and direct authority) (2006: 
69-70). In both Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
participants were limited to offering advice 
and consultation. For example, prior to the 
initiation of the process, the Saskatchewan 
government could be described as very pro-
nuclear. Soon after coming to power, 
Premier Brad Wall stated that “we would 
like to lead. It’s time for the country to have 
a national vision on nuclear energy - and we 
want to aggressively pursue that” (Howlett, 
2008). The governing Saskatchewan Party 
publicly desired everything from uranium 
upgrading, to a power reactor, to increased 
research and development, to medical 




isotopes. This was reflected in the mandate 
which they gave the UDP, which was not to 
assess in a neutral fashion the technical 
aspects of nuclear power, but to consider 
how to maximize the potential of the nuclear 
sector in Saskatchewan. Moreover, if the 
Saskatchewan party was replaced it is likely 
that the NDP would follow a similar path. 
This is because the NDP tacks towards its 
internal anti-nuclear faction while in 
opposition, but when it is in government it 
listens to its pro-nuclear wing.  
In contrast, the Alberta government 
could be described as agnostic on nuclear 
issues. There is no pro-nuclear political 
party in Alberta. The Progressive 
Conservatives, who have governed since 
1971 in what has been described as a “one 
party dominant” political system, have been 
very cautious when asked about nuclear 
power in the province. During his campaign 
for the Progressive Conservative leadership 
in 2006, Ed Stelmach did not advocate 
nuclear power (as did Jim Dinning, the 
perceived frontrunner), but instead promised 
to study whether it was a right fit for the 
province. After assuming the Premiership, 
there were some initial tentative comments, 
both in favour and in opposition, from some 
of Stelmach’s cabinet ministers.14 But once 
the NPEP was established a cone of silence 
went up around the government and no 
public comments were made except to say 
that they are consulting Albertans. Even 
when the government announced its 
conditional support for nuclear power in 
December 2009, there have been no 
comments outside of Premier Stelmach and 
Energy Minister Knight.  
Ultimately, the purpose of the public 
consultation process is to help elected 
officials come to a decision. Governments 
must weigh the advice of nuclear scientists, 
business people, and other experts with the 
concerns of ordinary citizens. In addition, 
governments must weigh the various tools 
that are used in the public consultation 
process. The Saskatchewan government, on 
the surface, appeared to throw out most of 
the results of the public consultation 
process. But, its decision to delay moving 
forward with a nuclear reactor was 
obviously informed by the strong, if not 
statistically accurate, opposition exhibited in 
the public hearings and submissions. This 
does not mean that the Wall government is 
disregarding the wishes of the public, but 
recognition that the public consultation 
process was controlled by special interest 
anti-nuclear groups who did not represent 
the majority view of Saskatchewanians.  
 The Alberta government’s decision 
further reflected its agnostic stance 
regarding nuclear power. It did not oppose 
nuclear power; instead it asserted that 
nuclear power, like all other forms of 
electricity, were private sector decisions. It 
did not support nuclear power; instead it 
explicitly stated that it would not put any 
public money into a nuclear project. This 
balancing act continued with its assessment 
of the results of the public consultation 
process. It opted to emphasize the 
quantitative results of the telephone survey 
over the online workbook. It also balanced 
the qualitative discussions in the stakeholder 
sessions with that of the focus groups. 
Regarding public hearings, the government 
noted that if a nuclear project went forward 
it would require a further three-year 
environmental assessment that would 
include public hearings. 
By applying Fung’s three 
dimensions, we can see that in the areas of 
communication and impact on policy-
making, that the public consultation 
processes in Saskatchewan and Alberta were 
similar. Participants could communicate by 
developing preferences and they could offer 
advice to the government, but the ultimate 
decision-making power remained exclusive 
to the government and, in the case of 




Alberta, private business. It was in the 
participation dimension that the two 
provinces differed. Saskatchewan was much 
more open (by allowing public hearings), 
but Alberta’s was more representative by 
utilizing tools that emphasized randomly-
selected individuals instead of self-selected 
ones.    
 Since our application of Fung’s three 
dimensions shows the importance of using 
multiple tools of public consultations, it is 
important to address the tools in more detail. 
This is because each tool has strengths and 
weaknesses. Telephone surveys may provide 
a statistically representative sample, but they 
do not have time to go into detail, and there 
is no opportunity for dialogue. Workbook 
submissions, either on-line or hardcopy, 
allow for greater detail including an 
opportunity to provide comments instead of 
just a sliding scale of responses. Workbooks 
also allow participants an opportunity to 
reflect on their answers. However, 
workbooks are time consuming, and this 
means that only the most motivated will take 
the time to fill them out. Therefore, you get 
the most intense responders, but not a 
statistically representative sample. Public 
hearings allow individuals and groups to 
prepare (such as with the workbooks), but 
with the additional benefits of a dialogue 
with other individuals and groups. In 
addition, if the media covers the event, it 
allows non-attendees to be educated about 
the subject. The public hearings in 
Saskatchewan generated substantial media 
coverage; in contrast, the nuclear issue in 
Alberta was below the radar. The downside 
of public hearings is that they can be 
hijacked by special interest groups and the 
silent majority can be ignored. Focus groups 
also allow for dialogue, but because they are 
randomly-selected they are more 
representative than public hearings. 
However, focus groups do not allow 
participants the time for preparation and 
reflection in advance of the meetings. In 
addition, there is the possibility that a 
facilitator could lead the participants in the 
pre-designated direction.  
 The other reason why multiple tools 
need to be used is that there is a strong 
correlation between the consultation tool 
and the result. In both Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, there was a wide divergence 
between the results of randomly-selected 
participants (telephone surveys, public 
opinion polls, focus groups) and self-
selected participants (public hearings 
attendees, online workbook submissions). 
Dan Perrins declared that 85% of 
participants opposed nuclear power, but this 
result contradicted numerous public opinion 
surveys that showed a slight majority of 
Saskatchewanians in favour of nuclear 
power.
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 In Alberta, as Table 1 showed, 
there was a similar gap.  
Conclusion 
 Public consultation is an inherent 
part of governmental decision-making on 
major public policy issues such as nuclear 
power. In designing a public consultation 
mechanism, government needs to determine 
if they want to simply consult citizens or 
whether it wants to cede some form of 
decision-making power. In addition, and as 
the public consultation processes in 
Saskatchewan and Alberta showed, 
designing the appropriate mechanisms is 
critical. This is because there are many 
possible tools in the toolbelt. An 
inappropriate mechanism can lead to 
accusations that “the decision is already a 
fait accompli,” or allowing a vocal minority 
to block a project that would greatly benefit 
the province. A proper design is only half 
the battle. When the results are in, 
governments need to weigh quantitative and 
qualitative data and randomly-selected 
versus self-selected responses. They need to 
assess the strength of economic and 
environmental arguments and balance 




scientific facts with democratic impulses. 
The ultimate judgement of the government’s 
decision, and the role of the public 
consultation process, occurs when the 
electorate either rewards or punishes the 
government at the ballot box.   
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1
 Ontario, New Brunswick, and Quebec are the only 
provinces which currently have nuclear power. 
Although each of them has been debating 
refurbishing existing reactors and building new ones, 
they have not used a formal public consultation 
process. This tells us that it is the introduction (not 
maintenance or expansion) of nuclear power which 
requires a public consultation process.  
2
 There were also technical appendices on the health 
and safety considerations of nuclear power, managing 
the risks of nuclear proliferation, introduction to 
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5
 The NRU in Canada (operational in 1957), HFR in 
the Netherlands (operational in 1961), BR2 in 
Belgium (operational in 1961), OSIRIS in France 
(operational in 1966), and SAFARI-1 in South Africa 
(operational in 1965). 
6
 19% were opposed to all uranium mining and 
exploration, 41% were opposed to further expansion 
of mining and exploration and 10% were opposed to 
expansion of mining and exploration with financial 
incentives (ie., reduced royalty rates) (Perrins, 2009: 
83-87). 
7
 60% supported medical isotope production without 
nuclear fission, 30% supported medical isotope 
production generally, and 10% were opposed to 
medical isotope production generally (Perrins, 2009: 
103). 
8
 Interview with Richard Florizone, Chair of the 
Uranium Development Partnership (Saskatoon, 23 
March, 2009),  
9
 When the UDP report was first released, the Wall 
government was quick to distance itself from the 
recommendation on nuclear noting that that it had 
already determined that there was a lack of public 
support for locating a nuclear waste repository in the 
province. (Hall and Paulson, 2009c).  
10
 Confidential email received by the author. 
11
 The telephone survey showed 40% of those who 
could explain nuclear details to others were 
supportive of nuclear power, compared to 10% who 
were “not familiar” with nuclear power at all. In 
addition, 31% of those who follow electricity news 
“very closely” were supportive of nuclear power, 
compared to 15% of those who follow electricity “not 
closely at all” (Innovative, 2009).  
12
 Interview with Albert Cooper, Lead Alberta 
Affairs, Bruce Power (Calgary, 9 September 2009). 
13
 Interview with Steve Coupland, Senior Advisor – 
Regulatory Affairs, Bruce Power (Calgary, 20 
October 2009). 
14
 For example, Treasury Board President Lloyd 
Snelgrove said that nuclear power was “a natural fit” 
for the oil sands, but Environment Minister Rob 
Renner responded that he was sceptical and was 
concerned about the disposal of nuclear waste 
(Fekete and Seskus, 2007). 
15
 In three separate polls conducted by Sigma 
Analytics for the Regina Leader-Post (November 
2006, May 2008, and April 2009) support for a 
uranium refinery has ranged between 57.2-75.1%. 
While support for the construction of a nuclear power 
plant is lower still: support has ranged between 47.8-
53.5%, while opposition has ranged between 30.5-
33.5% (Regina Leader-Post and Sigma Analytics, 
2009). An October 2009 online poll by Insightrix 
Research found that almost 62% expressed support 




                                                                         
for the development of a nuclear reactor in 
Saskatchewan. In addition, 75% of respondents “felt 
the feedback at public hearings this summer 
represented a very 
vocal minority of nuclear opponents” (Warren, 
2009a). 
